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Abstract — The 2010s saw a rapid increase in political partisanship and subsequent
extreme polarization in the United States and its political institutions and systems.
Additionally, political apathy among young adult and teenage voters has long been
beleaguered as a source of low voter turnout in the United States, at least
comparatively when considering other developed democracies. Considering these
points, this research paper seeks to identify whether rising political partisanship and
extreme polarization affect the disillusionment of teenage voters in the political
process of voting; do these phenomena discourage eligible teenagers from exercising
their right to vote? Previous research on the effect of extreme polarization and
partisanship on voting trends focuses on the voting eligible population (VEP) as a
whole, with no studies concerning the teenage (18-19) voting demographic
specifically. The vast majority of such studies have concluded that increases in the
aforementioned phenomena are correlated with higher voter turnout, suggesting
possible causation. In conducting subject interviews with fifteen eligible teenagers
who voted in the 2020 presidential election, content and correlational analyses were
used to identify whether this trend was similarly present among youth voters. The
resulting study found that, in line with the VEP as a whole, teenage voters cited an
increased likelihood to vote as a result of increasing partisanship and polarization
within the political climate, suggesting a positive correlation. Positive statistical
correlations were noted between the perceived levels of polarization and the
phenomenon’s influence on the likelihood to vote, as well as between partisanship
and the same effect. The results of this research imply that voter turnout efforts have
no cause to especially focus on youth voters in regard to polarization. Instead, charged
political climates will increase youth turnout as they do with the VEP as a whole,
suggesting that as polarization persists in the United States, there will be a concurrent
increased political engagement among youth voters.
Keywords — Political Partisanship, Polarization, Voter Turnout, Political
Engagement, Youth
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Introduction and Literature Review
Political polarization and partisan politics have existed since the founding of the
United States of America nearly 250 years ago. However, many scholars believe there
was a marked increase in polarization and mass partisanship which can be generally
identified. Although most scholars view polarization as a political trend which has been
occurring since the founding of the United States, many of these same scholars point
to the Reagan presidency as the previously mentioned turning point towards the
heightened political partisanship of the modern day.1 This identification of the Reagan
presidency is based on the observation of party realignment in both camps. On the
right, a gradual ideological realignment of the party elite—initiated by Reagan as an
effect of his economic and social programs—has been noted. This initially gradual
process was radically accelerated by a group of extremely conservative Republicans
from the South who subsequently replaced the formerly moderate wing of the
Republican Party.2 Simultaneously, the collapse of the Democratic Party in the South
led to the party’s image shifting towards a more liberal stance despite the fact that, in
reality, the Democrats were pursuing traditional, centrist policy agendas. These dual
dynamics led to the decline of bipartisanship, and an increase of partisan politics in
Congress3 while also contributing to the further polarization of party members4 and the
public.
Although there is some contestation over the specific point of interest
regarding the increase in political partisanship, there is a general agreement based on a
large body of evidence, that the two political parties in Congress, Democrats and
Republicans, are found to be in opposition with each other more frequently and more
consistently.5 This is evidenced through the percentage of roll-call votes which see a
majority of one political camp opposing the majority of the other having risen
significantly since the late 20th century and early 21st.6 Moreover, interest groups with
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political involvement have rated members of Congress as more ideologically split.7
Based on the extent to which opposition along party lines is reflective of ideology,
roll-call votes have shown growing ideological divergence in the last three decades.
Moreover, the relation between party identification and voting tendencies has reached
its highest level in the last 50 years, after the era of partisan dealignment of the 1960s
and 1970s8 highlighting a current peak of partisanship and polarization.
Meanwhile, as political polarization and partisan politics have undeniably taken
to new heights since the late 20th century, voter turnout of the voter-eligible population
(VEP), that is the voting-age population (VAP) that is legally able to cast a vote in a US
election, has generally remained relatively low. According to the United States Census
Bureau, in 2016, there was only 55.7% VAP turnout for the presidential election9
placing the country behind the large majority of its peers within the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) at 30th out of 35 total nations.
Moreover, the United States turnout rates have remained moderately consistent over
the past several decades with VAP turnout falling strictly within an 8.5% range from
just under 50% in Bill Clinton’s 1996 reelection to 58% in Obama’s 2008 inaugural
election.10
In analyses by age, the demographic which consistently sees the lowest turnout
in United States elections is that of youth voters. Youth voters, defined by the US
Census Bureau as voters aged 18-29, have composed the smallest portion of American
voters in every presidential election since 1988, never reaching above even 19% of all
voters who cast ballots.11 Meanwhile, when considering solely voter turnout rates by
age among selected age groups, those from 18-24 have repeatedly remained below their
peak in 2008 of a mere 45%.12 Teenage voters’ (18-19), who fall into the aforementioned
age groups, consistently low voter turnout has earned them the widely held perception
Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2004; Rohde, David W. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
7
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Polarization.” The American Political Science Review 95, no. 3 (2001): 619–31.
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that their demographic, as a whole, is politically apathetic, yet as their turnout has
declined, polarization and partisanship have undoubtedly increased.
This begs the question that is the subject of this research paper: How does political
partisanship, and consequent extreme polarization, affect the disillusionment of teenage voters in 2020
in regard to the political process of voting?
There have been substantial amounts of research done on the relationship
between levels of polarization and voter turnout but none which focus specifically on
VEP under 20 years old. Furthermore, these sources usually attempt to identify this
polarization as a cause of a sociopolitical factor indirectly related to voter turnout.
Years in which presidential candidates are ideologically similar, there is relatively
less turnout of both the voter-age population (VAP) and the voter-eligible population
(VEP). However, there exists a possibility that when candidates are more ideologically
diverse, and more polarization exists because of these differences, voter turnout is
higher in ideologues, while moderate voter turnout in comparison drops off due to the
increased polarization.13 But it has been found that self-identified moderates and nonideologues have not been turned off by the increasing polarization of political elites. In
fact, in more ideologically opposed campaigns, liberal, conservatives, and nonideologue/moderate voter turnout all increase. Overall, since 1996 as the two parties
have become increasingly polarized, VAP-based turnout has increased—though not
much—while VEP-based turnout has surged over the three elections from 1996 to
2004. Despite these fears regarding voter turnout, voters as a whole have begun to
participate more, not less, as political elites have polarized.14
Furthermore, it is clear that polarization of the political elite has led to an
increased cognizance of party differences as well as a heightened voter investment in
the outcome of elections.15 Previous research has found that American voters prefer
public officials to cooperate to solve nationwide problems and that they do not
appreciate political polarization. As stated above, some hypothesize that moderate
voters are especially likely to be disillusioned by partisan politics, extreme polarization,
and subsequent gridlock. In terms of moderate voters, who exist as the plurality of the
VEP at 36% of the voting population16, many scholars believe “participation, trust in
government, and other democratic “goods” will decline as voters increasingly see
Brady, David W., and Pietro S. Nivola. Red and Blue Nation? Consequences and Correction of America's
Polarized Politics. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford
University, 2008.
14
Ibid.
15
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Review of Political Science 11, no. 1 (2008): 563–88.
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16
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politics as ideological self-expression rather than an effort to solve problems important
to them.”17 However, there is little evidence that supports this prevailing thought.
General perceptions of government efficacy have risen as national polarization has
undeniably increased and even moderates have shown no signs of losing faith in
government efficacy and political processes. In particular, there exist substantiated
arguments that the polarized 2004 election produced record numbers of “active
citizens.”18 Whether this is entirely accurate is unclear, however, there is no evidence of
significant demobilization of the VAP because of the polarization of politics.19 This
once again demonstrates the motivating nature of polarization on the VAP as a whole.
Yet youth voters specifically still produce dismal turnout despite increasing polarization,
presenting a disconnect.
Further research shows that there is a positive correlation between voter turnout
and the number of parties which “goes against established wisdom that voter turnout
is depressed by multipartyism.”20 And furthermore, an increasingly diverse political
landscape as a result of ideological splits between political parties increases voters’
exposure to relevant issues. This increased exposure consequently increases voter’s
abilities to align themselves ideologically and therefore increases the chance these same
voters turnout to vote.21
According to a study published in the Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and
Parties, “an increase in one standard deviation in elite polarization increases turnout—
measured as a percentage of registered voters—by about 7 percentage points. This
effect increases to 9 percentage points when turnout is measured as a percentage of the
voting age population,”22 demonstrating that increased political polarization actually
increases voter turnout instead of encouraging disillusionment. Specifically, polarization
not only mobilizes voters by making clear the costs and benefits of turning out to vote
Fiorina, Morris P., and Samuel J. Abrams. “Political Polarization in the American Public.” Annual
Review of Political Science 11, no. 1 (2008): 563–88.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053106.153836.
18
Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. “Exploring the Bases of Partisanship in the American
Electorate: Social Identity vs. Ideology.” Political Research Quarterly 59, no. 2 (June 2006): 175–87.
https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290605900201.
19
Fiorina, Morris P., and Samuel J. Abrams. “Political Polarization in the American Public.” Annual
Review of Political Science 11, no. 1 (2008): 563–88.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053106.153836.
20
Crepaz, Markus M. L.. “The impact of party polarization and postmaterialism on voter
turnout.” European Journal of Political Research 18 (1990): 183-205. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14756765.1990.tb00228.x
21
Ibid., 183-205.
22
Béjar, Sergio, Juan Andrés Moraes and Santiago López-Cariboni. “Elite polarization and voting
turnout in Latin America, 1993–2010.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 30 (2018): 1-21.
https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2018.1545775
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Penn Journal of Philosophy Politics and Economics | Volume 17 | Spring 2022

5

but also clarifies the effects, both policy-wise and ideologically, of voters’ choices while
also generating increased party loyalty, which in turn increases turnout.23
Ultimately, the existing research on the effects of political partisanship and
extreme polarization on voter turnout currently fails to explore the connection between
these political phenomena and teenage voter turnout in the 2020 presidential election
specifically. All available published research focuses on the voting-age population as a
whole prior to the 2020 presidential election between Joseph Biden and incumbent
Donald Trump, suggesting a gap exists in research on teenage voting patterns in 2020.

Hypothesis
To answer the research question—how does political partisanship, and consequent
extreme polarization, affect the disillusionment of teenage voters in 2020 in regard to the political
process of voting—previous research and studies were analyzed to guide hypotheses. The
research conducted by Béjar, Moraes, and López-Cariboni (2018) regarding elite
polarization and voter turnout24 was quite authoritative on the subject: Political
polarization raises the stakes in both local and national elections and thus increases
mobilization of voters.
Although youth are commonly beleaguered as being politically apathetic, I
predicted that, in line with noted trends, there would be a positive correlation between
high levels of perceived polarization/partisanship and voter turnout among the
demographic.

Methodology
In order to analyze the relationship between the extreme political partisanship,
the consequent polarization that is widely recognized to exist in the United States of
America as of 2020, and youth voter turnout it is necessary to conduct a number of
interviews that will elucidate the effects of the political landscape on United States’
youth voting habits and tendencies.
To this end, fifteen interviewees were chosen at random on a voluntary basis.
Interviews sought to collect information including, but not limited to age, gender
identity, voter registration, political affiliation, political activity/involvement, voting
habits, perception of levels of polarization in the United States, perception of the
effects of polarization, influence of polarization on political activity, level of
aforementioned influence, and the influence of partisanship on polarization. The
quantitative data was statistically analyzed and aggregated in a number of ways to
23
24

Ibid., 1-21.
Ibid., 1-21.

Penn Journal of Philosophy Politics and Economics | Volume 17 | Spring 2022

6

Political Partisanship and Youth Voter Turnout
calculate multiple correlation coefficients (r²) and compile findings which are
displayed and discussed below.
Through in-depth interviews, not only can statistical connections be made, but
there exist opportunities for follow-up questions, deeper probing, and increased
flexibility. This versatility allows for a more holistic understanding of attitudes,
perceptions, and motivations of the interviewees. The consequential qualitative data
obtained from interviews will be employed to illuminate trends that exist between
political polarization, extreme partisanship and teenage voting habits. Additionally,
this data will be employed to identify valuable investigative findings that provide
greater insight into the aforementioned areas of inquiry.
Interviewees were interviewed through virtual platforms for accessibility and
convenience purposes as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, including Apple
FaceTime and Zoom Video Communications. Interviews occurred over an
approximately 1-to-2-week period in late January to early February of 2021, roughly 3
months after the November 3, 2020 general election. No names or other personal
information of interviewees will be discussed in this research paper, and to protect
anonymity volunteers will be labeled by letter i.e., Subject A, B, C, and so on. Verbal
consent to draw data from interviews was also obtained from each subject prior to
questioning.
To effectively analyze the qualitative data garnered from the fifteen interviews,
several steps were taken. Interview audio was recorded using Apple Voice Memos and
remained accessible only to myself to protect the anonymity of subjects. The audio
from each interview was similarly transcribed by myself and these transcriptions were
organized by assigned subject designation labels (Subject A, B, C, etc.). Transcripts
were then annotated for qualitative correlations between the answers to various
questions asked including, but not limited to, political activity; political affiliation;
perception of levels of polarization and partisanship, respectively; personal opinions
on the prevalence and effect of polarization and partisanship; voting behaviors and
habits; and explanations and elaborations of beliefs. Annotations were completed by
coding each question based on subject answer. Employing thematic content analysis of
the transcript annotations and coding, overarching impressions present in the data
and common themes and patterns were identified. In order to align and conceptualize
these data patterns, codes were grouped into categories and subcategories, followed
by the segmentation of this data which described the connections between the data
groups. These data segments were then analyzed for relative importance and relevance
to the research subject matter at hand. This analysis was then used to answer the
research question—how does political partisanship, and consequent extreme polarization, affect
the disillusionment of teenage voters in 2020 in regard to the political process of voting—and related
queries.
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Results
A total of fifteen (15) subjects were interviewed regarding their perceptions of
extreme polarization, political partisanship, and their voting behaviors—among other
things. These subjects are referred to as Subjects A-O. No special consideration was
given to maintaining an equal number of each gender identity among subjects but
nonetheless seven female, seven male, and one non-binary persons were interviewed.
No special consideration was given to maintaining an equal number of each age in the
age range of study (18-19 years of age) and twelve 18-year-olds were interviewed while
three 19-year-olds were similarly interviewed. Figure 1 displays this demographic data.
Figure 1. Subjects A-O demographics, age and gender
Subject
Age
Gender
A
18
Female
B
18
Male
C
18
Male
D
18
Female
E
19
Male
F
18
Female
G
18
Female
H
18
Non-binary
I
19
Male
J
18
Female
K
18
Female
L
18
Female
M
18
Female
N
19
Male
O
18
Male
Moreover, it is important to note that out of all fifteen subjects interviewed
100% of participants were registered to vote at the time of the 2020 presidential
election. Similarly, all fifteen (100%) of respondents answered as to having voted in
the 2020 presidential election.
Another demographic question which was posed to respondents regarded their
registered party affiliation—an additional data point. Out of the fifteen participants,
eight were registered Democrats (53.33%), five were registered independents
(33.33%), and two were registered Republicans (13.33%).
All the data discussed so far has been strictly objective in nature whereas the
results in the following paragraphs of section IV of this paper are data points that deal
with respondents’ subjective opinions, perceptions, and ratings. Moreover, the bulk of
Penn Journal of Philosophy Politics and Economics | Volume 17 | Spring 2022
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the data below will be qualitative in nature, analyzed through thematic content analysis
with ancillary quantitative data included throughout.
In terms of the interview questions asked to respondents, there were four
major recurring questions that were asked of each respondent. Figure 2 displays these
questions. As seen in Figure 2 the questions dealt with respondents’ personal
motivations for voting; their opinions on the negative effects of polarization; their
perception of the extent of the existence of political partisanship; and their opinion on
the extent to which political partisanship and extreme polarization are connected.
Figure 2. Recurring questions
Question Number
#R1

#R2

#R3

#R4

Question
In your own words could you explain
what your motivation was for voting in
the 2020 presidential election?
To what extent do you think that
polarization has negative effects on the
US? This could be in terms of
government efficiency or how
polarization trickles down into the
population or any other effects you may
identify.
Could you elaborate on why you choose
the number you did to represent the
extent extreme partisanship is present in
our political system (on a scale of 1-20)?
Are there specific examples or instances
that stand out to you?
Could you elaborate on why you chose
the number you did in terms of the
extent to which extreme partisanship
contributes to the polarization we
previously discussed (on a scale of 1-20)?
Are there specific examples or instances
that stand out to you?

The segmentation of this data requires the identification of common themes
among respondents’ elaborations on the four questions asked of them in Figure 2. The
number of common themes were determined by a lack of substantial novelty; that is,
one or more respondent’s responses included said theme which varied by question.
The number of times a theme was verbalized was recorded and the basis for each
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unique reference was determined based on extensive and repeated reviews of the
audio file of each interviewee. This data can be viewed in Figure A in the appendix.
The first recurring question (#R1) asked of respondents dealt with their
personal motivations to vote (see Figure 2); answer length and depth varied. The
themes that emerged in the answers gathered from the fifteen respondents are
displayed in Figure 3 below. Five central themes emerged.
Figure 3. Themes in respondent answers to recurring question one (#R1)
Question
Theme Demarcated by
Theme Description
Changing prior
circumstances; ousting
R1.1
President Trump; affecting
wanted change in
government
Passion for civic
R1.2
engagement
#R1
Ensuring respondent’s voice
R1.3
be heard
Respondent’s first year
R1.4
voting
Parents influenced
R1.5
respondent to vote
The first theme (R1.1) that appeared throughout recorded answers dealt with
the altering of current political and societal circumstances of the United States (as of
November 2020) by affecting desired change in the government and/or ousting
former president and incumbent Donald Trump. This theme arose eleven total times
across respondents for this specific question, the most of any of themes found
present in #R1 answers. For example, Subject A said, “I knew that we needed a
presidential candidate that would move forward and not have such disgusting
views…I was just kind of fed up with our country.” The other theme that had a
relatively pronounced prevalence among respondent answers, appearing ten times,
was theme R1.3, related to a desire to make one’s voice heard. Subject F encapsulated
this sentiment: “I know that’s a really important part of American culture, to vote in
an election.”
The following question first introduced the idea of political polarization and
asked subjects to rate how polarized they believe United States politics to be currently
(as of November 2020) on a scale from one to twenty. The definition of political
polarization provided to respondents was the following: a sorting of political
convictions by either the mass public or ruling elites, or both, into roughly two
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distinct camps: In the US this includes persons inclined to support the Democratic or
the Republican parties’ policies and candidates for elected office. The mean rating was
16.4 (from 1-20) and Figure 4 displays the breadth of ratings given by each of the
fifteen respondents with each point on the scatter plot representing a separate
respondent, beginning with Subject A on the left-most side of the graph and ending
with Subject O on the right-most side.
Figure 4. Perceived levels of polarization in United States politics on a scale of one to twenty,
responses of Subjects A-O

Level of Polarizatiton (1-20)

Perceived Levels of Polarization in United States
Politics
20

F, 20 G, 20
15
10

E, 18
A, 16

B, 15

C, 16

K, 18

D, 15

I, 15

H, 13

J, 14

M, 18

O, 17
N, 17

L, 14

5
0

Subjects A-O

The questions then returned to the second of four recurring elaborative
questions asked of respondents (#R2). The second dealt with subjects’ opinions of
the negative effects that political polarization has on both the government and the
United States at large (see Figure 2). Prompting was given for this question,
encouraging respondents to discuss both of the previously mentioned points of
interest but subjects were given the ability to discuss their thoughts freely. The themes
that emerged in the answers gathered from the fifteen respondents are displayed in
Figure 5 below. Four central themes emerged.
Figure 5. Themes in respondent answers to recurring question two (#R2)
Question
Theme Demarcated by
Theme Description
Use of the word, or
R2.1
synonym of, “divided”
References to assumptions
#R2
R2.2
made about the opposite
party
References to extreme party
R2.3
loyalty and/or an
Penn Journal of Philosophy Politics and Economics | Volume 17 | Spring 2022
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R2.4

unwillingness to listen to the
other side
References to
policy/political gridlock and
inefficiency

Among the respondent answers to #R2, less themes appeared but appeared
with greater average frequency than those of #R1. The first was the use of the word
“divided” or a related synonym in respondents’ answers, with 19 occurrences
recorded, or 1.266 uses on average by each respondent. Subject G is quoted saying,
“[polarization] trickles down into society and it’s creating divide,” reflecting the
sentiments of most respondents. Themes R2.3 and R2.4 were recorded 22 (1.466
average uses) and 20 (1.333 average uses) times, respectively. R2.3 denotes references
to extreme party loyalty and/or an unwillingness to listen to the opposite party. This
theme spans across responses to recurring questions two, three, and four. Subject M’s
response to #R2 is an accurate depiction of theme R2.3, saying, “…you’re either on
one side or you’re on the other…so I think we see a lot of extremism…”
Alternatively, Subject K’s response fittingly displayed R2.4, “…no laws are
passed…when you look at things like gun control…they’re not passing laws that are
really simple like any background checks and it's a lot of common-sense policy that
just doesn't get moved.”
The effect of political polarization on respondents’ decision to vote was also
collected. Figure 6 plots this effect (on a scale of 1-20) against the level of political
polarization respondents identified exists in United States politics (on a scale of 1-20).
The r² coefficient, relating these two data sets was equal to 0.2248 indicating a weak
positive correlational relationship. The outlier data point in Figure 6 is that of Subject
H who in their responses to posed questions took a non-establishment approach,
rebuking the two-party system and the political process of voting. The negative value
attached to the subject’s scaled rating is due to the fact that, although they did vote,
the level of polarization strongly influenced them to not vote, hence the negative
value.
Figure 6. Perceived levels of polarization in United States politics on a scale of one to twenty
in relation to the influence of polarization on respondents’ decision to vote on a scale of 1-20,
responses of Subjects A-O
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Influence on Vote (1-20)

Polarization and Youth Voter Influence
20
15

R² = 0.2248

10
5
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0
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10

12

14

16

18

20

Linear (Series1)

-10
-15
-20

Polarization (1-20)

The next question first introduced the idea of political partisanship and asked
subjects to rate the extent to which extreme political partisanship is present in the
United States political system on a scale from one to twenty. The definition of
partisanship provided to respondents was the following: the quality or action of
strongly supporting a person's principle or political party often without considering or
judging the matter very carefully. The mean rating was 17.267 (from 1-20), higher
than that of the presence of polarization by 0.867 points. Figure 7 displays the breadth
of ratings given by each of the fifteen respondents with each point on the scatter plot
representing a separate respondent, beginning with Subject A on the left-most side of
the graph and ending with Subject O on the right-most side.

Level of Partisanship (1-20)

Figure 7. Perceived levels of partisanship in United States political systems on a scale of one
to twenty, responses of Subjects A-O
Perceived Levels of Extreme Partisanship in United States
Political Systems
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

E, 20 F, 20 G, 20

A, 19

C, 18
B, 15

N, 19

J, 18 K, 18
D, 15

H, 14

I, 15

O, 18

L, 15 M, 15

Subjects A-O

The questions then, once again, returned to the qualitative set with the third of
four recurring elaborative questions (#R3). This question asked participants to
elaborate on their answer to the previous quantitative question regarding their rating
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of the level of extreme political partisanship present in United States political systems
(see Figure 2). The themes that emerged in connection to responses to #R3 are listed
in Figure 8. Six themes were identified.
Figure 8. Themes in respondent answers to recurring question three (#R3)
Question
Theme Demarcated by
Theme Description
References to a lack of
R3.1
accountability for political
candidates
Reference to the January 6,
R3.2
2021 Capitol
insurrection/riot
References to extreme party
loyalty and/or an
#R3
R3.3
unwillingness to listen to the
other side
References to cult-like
R3.4
behavior
R3.5
References to social media
References to ousting
R3.6
former President Trump
In response to this third question (#R3), more themes appeared but only two
were of great significance as a measure of the frequency of verbalization. Theme R3.3
dealt with the same content as R2.3, denoting references to extreme party loyalty
and/or an unwillingness to listen to the opposite party. This theme appears 32 times
across response to #R3, an average of 2.133 times per subject. The second most
prevalent theme was R3.6 which describes references to the ousting of former
president and incumbent Donald Trump, appearing 22 times for an average of 1.467
references per subject. Subject I focused on this theme saying, “most people were just
voting against Trump more than anything…and they didn’t really…I guess they
cared…who’s the other one,” in his response.
The following question posed a connection between two phenomena on which
this paper focuses: political partisanship and extreme polarization, asking respondents
if they believed the two were connected. Specifically, respondents were asked if they
believed political partisanship contributes to extreme polarization. All 15 (100%)
subjects replied yes. Subjects were then asked to rate the extent to which they believed
the two phenomena are connected on a scale of one to twenty. The mean response to
this question was 16.6 (from 1-20). Figure 9 displays the breadth of ratings given by
each of the fifteen respondents with each point on the scatter plot representing a
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separate respondent, beginning with Subject A on the left-most side of the graph and
ending with Subject O on the right-most side.
Figure 9. Perceived connection between extreme polarization and political partisanship on a
scale of one to twenty, responses of Subjects A-O
Perceived Connection Between Polarization and
Partisanship

Connection (1-20)
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5
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Questioning continued with the last recurring elaborative question (#R4). This
particular question asked respondents to elaborate on their rating of the extent to
which they believe political partisanship contributes to extreme polarization (see Figure
2). The themes that emerged in response to question #R4 are listed in Figure 10. Three
themes were identified.
Figure 10. Themes in respondent answers to recurring question four (#R4)
Question
Theme Demarcated by
Theme Description
References to extreme party
loyalty and/or an
R4.1
unwillingness to listen to the
other side
#R4
Use of the word, or
R4.2
synonym of, “divided”
Equating of polarization
R4.3
and partisanship
Most significant was theme R4.1 which measured the same theme as R2.3 and
R3.3: references to extreme party loyalty and/or an unwillingness to listen to the
opposite party. This theme appeared 34 times (2.267 times per subject on average) in
response to question #R4. Subject N, in response, replied, “the extreme right and
extreme left…both just despise each other, and I think it adds to polarization a lot.”
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Moreover, theme R4.2, the use of the word “divided”, or a related synonym was
counted 14 times. Theme R4.3 in which respondents equated polarization and
partisanship occurred 11 times.
The effect of extreme political partisanship on respondents’ decision to vote
was also collected in the same manner as was the influence of polarization. Figure 11
plots this effect (on a scale of 1-20) against the level of political partisanship
respondents identified exists in the United States (on a scale of 1-20). The r²
coefficient, relating these two data sets was equal to 0.0645 indicating an extremely
weak, or nonexistent, positive correlational relationship. The outlier data point in
Figure 11 is once again anti-establishment Subject H.
Figure 11. Perceived levels of partisanship in United States politics on a scale of one to twenty
in relation to the influence of partisanship on respondents’ decision to vote on a scale of 1-20,
responses of Subjects A-O
Influence on Vote (1-20)
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Lastly, respondents were asked to rate how engaged and informed they are on
political issues on a scale of one to twenty. The mean response was 12.533 and Figure
12 displays the breadth of ratings given by each of the fifteen respondents with each
point on the scatter plot representing a separate respondent, beginning with Subject A
on the left-most side of the graph and ending with Subject O on the right-most side.
Figure 12. Self-reported levels of political engagement and knowledge of topical political issues,
responses of Subjects A-O
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Discussion
Concerning the research question—how does political partisanship, and consequent
extreme polarization, affect the disillusionment of teenage voters in 2020 in regard to the political
process of voting—a number of conclusions have been drawn from the above results.
The perceived levels of political partisanship and extreme polarization, the
main focus of this study, were skewed based on the condition of being affiliated with
an established political party. On average, registered independents perceived higher
levels of both phenomena than their counterparts who were either registered
Republicans or Democrats. In fact, the average difference was over 1.2 points in both
cases (Figures 13 and 14).
Figure 13. Party affiliation and average perceived levels of extreme polarization in the US
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Figure 14. Party affiliation and average perceived levels of political partisanship in the US
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The fact that all respondents voted in the 2020 presidential election
irrespective of the levels of polarization and partisanship they identified is
illuminating. The nature of the United States two-party system forces independents
and moderates to align themselves with one party or another each election (supposing
they do not vote for a third-party candidate) which, when candidates are so
ideologically divergent, like in the 2020 presidential election, could serve as a force of
disillusionment. However, despite independents registering a higher level of
polarization and partisanship than their affiliated counterparts, they voted in the same
proportion. Such a trend suggests that while independents are more politically aware
and/or less biased, partisanship and polarization are not sources of disillusionment in
the political process of voting across the spectrum of political affiliation at least.
With the fact that all respondents, Subjects A-O, voted, it is worth analyzing
the perceived levels of both political partisanship and extreme polarization. In terms
of the former, the average level of extreme partisanship out of 20 (Fig. 7) was
determined to be 17.3 while in terms of the latter, the average level of political
polarization out of 20 (Fig. 4) was determined to be 16.4. Objectively, these averages
are quite high, falling in the upper 80% of the given range of answers. Since voting
remained consistent—in that all respondents voted—in spite of these extremely high
perceived levels of partisanship and polarization, it is valid to conclude from these
data points alone that neither necessarily disillusioned youth voters in the 2020
presidential election.
Moreover, data collected from all respondents yielded that the average level of
connection between polarization and partisanship out of 20 (Fig. 9) was determined to
be 16.6, once again falling in the upper 80% of the possible answer range. Given that
most respondents believe the two phenomena to be connected it can be surmised that
either polarization begets partisanship, or more likely that partisanship begets
polarization. The latter in fact is more likely based on respondent answers to various
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follow-up questions such as unrepeated questions #U5, #U7, and #U9 (see Appendix
Figure B). With this finding, the conclusion can be made that partisanship is perceived
by many to partially, or fully, cause polarization. It could be possible that high levels
of polarization indirectly increase youth voter turnout in American presidential
elections. However, further research would need to be conducted in order to solidify
such a claim.
Political polarization and its effect on voting revealed that respondents who
reported a higher influence of the phenomenon on their choice to vote also noted
higher levels of political polarization in general. Those who noted a “higher” influence
were respondents who reported the influence on their decision to vote higher than a
10 out of 20. This was 16 out of 20 respondents. On average these respondents noted
an 8.8-point greater influence of polarization on their decision to vote which
corresponded with a 2.2-point greater average perception of the presence of political
polarization. This connection displays that the group of subjects which noted less
polarization also noted the phenomenon had less of an influence on their decision to
vote. Thus, the main conclusion drawn from such a data point is that higher perceived
levels of polarization did not increase youth voter disillusionment but in fact propelled
American youth to the voting booths in the 2020 presidential election.
A similar trend was noted when focusing on political partisanship: subjects who
reported a higher influence of political partisanship on their decision to vote also
noted higher average levels of the phenomenon in general. Those who noted a
“higher” influence were those respondents which reported the influence on their
decision to vote higher than a 10 out of 20. This was 15 out of 20 respondents. On
average these subjects noted a 10.5534-point greater influence of partisanship on their
decision to vote, corresponding with a, albeit less significant, but still present, .44point greater average perception of the presence of extreme political partisanship.
Although the connection is more tenuous in this instance, there is data that suggests
higher levels of perceived political partisanship also did not increase American youth
voter disillusionment but encouraged their participating in the political process of
voting in the 2020 presidential election.
This study has already established that youth voters believe political
partisanship and extreme polarization to be connected, generally with the former
causing the latter. However, the statistical analysis of perceived levels of each
phenomenon and the correlated influence of the phenomena on subjects’ decision to
vote demonstrates that they are not equal in influence. The mere .44-point difference
in average levels of polarization perceived is correlated with a nearly 11-point
difference in influence on voting habits suggesting that even slight differentiations in
perceptions of the extent to which polarization is present can lead to much larger
effects on youth voting behavior. Simply put, a 2.2-point average difference in
polarization was connected with a four times as large difference in voter influence
while a .44-point average difference in partisanship was connected with a nearly twentyPenn Journal of Philosophy Politics and Economics | Volume 17 | Spring 2022
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four times as large difference in voter influence. This calls for further research with a
more extensive population on the disconnect between polarization and partisanship
and their related influences on voter turnout.
Data beyond statistical analysis also suggests that polarization and partisanship
positively influenced American youth to vote in the 2020 presidential election. In
answers to #R1, the theme of ousting former President Trump (R1.1) arose nearly 11
times, more than any other suggesting that loyalty to the Democratic Party was a
major factor in subjects’ decisions to vote: a clear demonstration of partisanship at the
voter level. However, subjects’ responses about the effects of Donald Trump’s time in
office, with respect to the same question, also show that the high levels of polarization
he perpetuated within the United States’ political systems was a motivation for voting.
Coupled with the frequency the theme appeared, this data clearly indicates that both
polarization and partisanship influenced youth voters to vote, not disillusioning them.
Recurring question 2 (#R2) dealt with the negative effects of polarization,
namely inefficiency in government. The most common themes centered around
extreme party loyalty and polarization (R2.3) and policy gridlock (R2.4), mentioned a
combined total of 42 times. Given this data, it is possible that extreme party loyalty
(extreme political partisanship) and its effects i.e., policy gridlock caused increased
youth voter turnout. #R1 and #R2 established that subjects largely voted to remove
Trump from office because they believe that he perpetuated polarization and
partisanship that damaged the United States.
This trend continued with recurring question 3 (#R3) as subjects once again
referenced themes such as extreme party loyalty and polarization (R3.3) and ousting
former President Trump (R3.6). These themes were mentioned for a combined total
of 54 times. Ousting the then current president being a significant theme of subject
responses when asked to identify examples of partisanship clearly demonstrates that
partisanship played a major role in voter turnout. Moreover, continued references to
party loyalty show that youth voters recognize extremely high levels of political
polarization to exist in the US while previous questions demonstrate that youth voters
have connected this polarization with government inefficiency, of which rectifying
was a key motivation for voting. This clearly displays polarization’s indirect impact on
affecting increased youth voter turnout.
Continuing with recurring question 4 (#R4) subjects again referenced the
theme of extreme party loyalty and polarization (R4.1) as well as the equating of
polarization and partisanship (R4.3). These themes were referenced for a combined
total of 45 times with R4.1 mentioned 34 times alone. Given that polarization has
previously been identified by subjects as a motivation for voting and a number of
respondents even equated partisanship and polarization, the effect of partisanship on
youth voting habits can also be deduced. Essentially the equating of the two
phenomena in popular youth voter perception means that the explicit influence of
one, as previously stated, signifies a similar implicit influence of the other.
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Consequently, as a result of the frequency of theme R4.3 it is quite evident both
extreme polarization and political partisanship are motivators for the youth
population to vote.
In total, indirect references to extreme polarization and political partisanship in
answer to the four recurring questions occurred 173 unique times. This is a clear
indication of the relevance of polarization and partisanship in the political climate
surrounding the 2020 presidential election. Given 100% of subjects voted, this points
to the fact that youth voters were aware of such a climate but were not disillusioned by
that same climate, at least to a point of withdrawal from the political system in
choosing to not vote.
Although much of the evidence points to extreme polarization and political
partisanship being non-factors in the disillusionment of the youth voting population
there are some important limitations to the study which produced such results. To
begin the population size only consisted of 15 youth voters due to time and
population availability restraints, as well as limited resources. Such a small sample size
has implications for the reliability of correlation coefficients as well as other statistical
data presented. Finally, on average respondents rated themselves 12.3 out of 20 when
asked how politically informed and engaged they were suggesting responses to
interview questions and consequent quantitative and qualitative data may not be as
valuable versus if the sample population were more informed/engaged on average.
The data clearly points to the fact that there is a positive correlation between
high levels of extreme polarization/political partisanship and voter turnout. Thus, the
data has confirmed the hypothesis that there is a positive correlation between high
levels of perceived polarization/partisanship and voter turnout among teenagers.
Youth voters were clearly aware of increased polarization and partisanship and yet still
voted in spite of such a climate. In fact, not only does the data show that both
phenomena did not disillusion youth voters but in fact motivated them to vote.
Although more research would have to be conducted in order to prove such a causal
relationship, the study demonstrates cursory evidence to such a conclusion.
In answer to the research question— how does political partisanship, and consequent
extreme polarization, affect the disillusionment of teenage voters in 2020 in regard to the political
process of voting—neither political partisanship nor extreme polarization disillusions the
demographic and evidence suggests both positively influence youth voter turnout.
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Appendix
Figure A. Number of occurrences of each theme in respondent answers to recurring questions
#R1-#R4
Question
Themes
No. Occurrences

#R1

#R2

#R3

R1.1

11

R1.2

2

R1.3

10

R1.4

3

R1.5

2

R2.1

19

R2.2
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R2.3

22

R2.4

20

R3.1

2

R3.2

6

R3.3

32

R3.4

2

R3.5
refer to #U10

5

R3.6

22
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#R4

Figure B. Unrepeated questions
Question Number
#U1

#U2

#U3

#U4

#U5

#U6

#U7

R4.1
refer to #U7

34

R4.2

14

R4.3

11

Question
Would you say that some media outlets
are more conservative, and some are
more liberal leaning? (In reference to
#R5)
Are there any specific political events
you would point to where this is pretty
obvious? (In reference to #R4)
Would you say there is a much more
divided public opinion? People were
either right or left...there weren’t many
moderates this election? (In reference to
#R3)
Would you say that partisanship had
made the government inefficient in
terms of passing legislation or anything
like that (In reference to #R4)
So that facade of polarization that...
where you're basically saying that elites
create a kind of atmosphere of
polarization that pits people, non-elites,
against each other, correct? (In reference
to #R2)
Would you say that media is a strong
indicator of the level of partisanship in
the country right now? (In reference to
#R3)
In your opinion, would you say that
people who are buying into the twoparty system are also buying into
extreme partisanship which essentially
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#U8

#U9

#U10

precipitates polarization at a variety of
levels? (In reference to #R4)
Would you say that new media, like
social media, as well as traditional media
like cable news networks both
contributed to the level of polarization
and partisanship? (In reference to #R5)
Would you say that extreme partisanship
leads to people closing themselves off
from the other party and that in turn
creates polarization? (In reference to
#R4)
Would you say that one of the
candidates weaponized media in order to
actually increase the level of polarization
and partisanship in our country? (In
reference to #R5)
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